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UNITED STATES v. ARTHUR YOUNG & CO.: JUDICIAL
DEATH KNELL FOR AUDITORS' PRIVILEGE AND
SUGGESTED CONGRESSIONAL
RESURRECTION
The judicial controversy of whether the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice (IRS) may gain access to an independent auditor's tax accrual
workpapers' is over. In United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 2 the
United States Supreme Court unanimously held that the IRS may
obtain an independent auditor's workpapers pursuant to its sum-
mons power under section 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code
(Code).3 Although the Court's decision in Arthur Young ends judicial
attempts to exempt these workpapers from section 7602,4 the battle
is not over. The Arthur Young decision simply shifts the battleground
I Tax accrual workpapers also are known as tax pool workpapers, tax provision
workpapers, and tax liability contingency analysis workpapers. This Note employs the
term "tax accrual workpapers" for uniformity and convenience. See infra notes 32-35
and accompanying text (discussing tax accrual workpapers).
2 465 U.S. 805 (1984).
3 26 U.S.C. § 7602 (1982). Section 7602 provides in relevant part:
For the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return,
determining the liability of any person for any internal revenue tax...
the Secretary [of the Treasury Department] or his delegate is author-
ized-
(1) To examine any books, papers, records, or other data which may
be relevant or material to such inquiry;
(2) To summon the person liable for tax or required to perform the
act, or any officer or employee of such person, or any person having pos-
session, custody, or care of books of account containing entries relating
to the business of the person liable for tax or required to perform the act,
or any other person the Secretary or his delegate may deem proper, to
appear before the Secretary or his delegate at a time and place named in
the summons and to produce such books, papers, records, or other data,
and to give such testimony, under oath, as may be relevant or material to
such inquiry; and
(3) To take such testimony of the person concerned, under oath, as
may be relevant or material to such inquiry.
26 U.S.C. § 7602(a) (1982). The summons power granted to the Secretary of the Treas-
ury Department and delegated to the IRS is enforced pursuant to § 7604 of the Code.
Section 7604 reads in relevant part:
If any person is summoned under the internal revenue laws to appear, to
testify, or to produce books, papers, records, or other data, the United
States district court for the district in which such person resides or is
found shall have jurisdiction by appropriate process to compel such at-
tendance, testimony, or production of books, papers, records, or other
data.
26 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (1982).
4 See United States v. Arthur Young, 677 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1982), aj'd in part, rev'd
in part, 465 U.S. 805 (1984); United States v. Coopers & Lybrand, 550 F.2d 615 (10th
Cir. 1977). See also infra notes 36-59 and accompanying text.
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from the courts to Congress. Congress now must decide whether
public policy reasons justify the result in Arthur Young, or whether a
statutory privilege for an independent auditor's tax accrual
workpapers should be enacted.
This Note describes the judicial controversy over tax accrual
workpapers that existed prior to Arthur Young and discusses the Ar-
thur Young case, evaluating the Supreme Court's policy reasons
against recognition of an auditor privilege for tax accrual
workpapers. The Note argues that a legislatively created auditor
privilege for tax accrual workpapers is justified because of its posi-
tive benefits to the public securities system and the federal taxing
structure. The Note also proposes the substance of appropriate
privilege legislation that Congress should enact.
I
THE AUDIT PROCESS
A. Audits and Auditors
In a typical audit engagement, an independent auditor exam-
ines, tests, and reviews the financial statements prepared by a com-
pany's management. This independent examination of a company's
financial statements is an integral part of the protection accorded
investors in the public securities markets. Publicly held corpora-
tions must file audited financial statements with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) to register a new security issue,5 list a
security on an exchange, 6 solicit proxies, 7 and comply with SEC an-
nual financial reporting requirements.8 Investors may rely on au-
dited financial statements when making investment decisions
regarding securities of publicly held corporations. Furthermore,
privately held companies often must submit to an annual audit to
obtain credit from private lenders and capital from private investors,
although such companies are not subject to the reporting require-
ments of the SEC.9
5 Securities Act of 1933, Schedule A (25)-(27), 15 U.S.C. § 77aa (1982).
6 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 12(b)(1)(J)-(L), 15 U.S.C. § 78 /(b)(1)(J)-(L)
(1982).
7 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1982); Schedule 14A,
Item 15, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (1985).
8 Securities Act of 1934 § 13(a)(2), 13(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a)(2) (1982); 17 C.F.R.
§ 249.310 (1985).
9 See, e.g., In re Newton, 718 F.2d 1015, 1017 n.2 (11th Cir. 1983) (bank required
audited financial statements for credit), cert. denied sub nom. Trio Mfg. Co. v. United
States, 466 U.S. 904 (1984). See generally A. ARENS &J. LOEBBECKE, AUDITING: AN INTE-
GRATED APPROACH 1-2 (2d ed. 1980) (audited financial statements provide necessary in-
formation to private decisionmaker because of frequent lack of adequate personal
knowledge).
1986] 695
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
The SEC requires that an independent certified public account-
ant (CPA) or public accountant audit the financial statements of
publicly held companies according to generally accepted auditing
standards (GAAS). 10 These standards also govern a CPA's conduct
in auditing the financial statements of privately held companies."'
The standards require an auditor to state whether the financial
statements are presented fairly in accordance with generally ac-
cepted accounting principles (GAAP).1 2 The GAAP standard, used
to measure financial presentations, is the aggregate of accounting
conventions, rules, and procedures of currently accepted accounting
practice.13 In short, an independent auditor examines the records
of a company using GAAS to determine whether the company's fi-
nancial statements are presented fairly in accordance with GAAP.
Generally, an auditor does not examine all transactions entered
into by a company during the period under audit. According to
GAAS, the "cost of audits should bear a reasonable relationship to
the benefits expected to be derived." 14 The primary method of pro-
viding adequate audit evidence at an acceptable cost is selective test-
ing of transactions. 15 Requiring an audit of all transactions would
be economically infeasible. 16
10 Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-02(b) (1984). GAAS represent the minimum
professional standards for conducting an audit. 1 AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED
PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, AICPA PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS AU § 150.02 (1982) [hereinaf-
ter cited as PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS].
11 2 PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, supra note 10, at ET § 202.01.
12 1 id. at AU § 410.01.
13 Id. at AU § 411.02. The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), the ac-
counting profession's current accounting standard-setting body, formulates GAAP by
issuing pronouncements. See A. ARENS &J. LOEBBECKE, supra note 9, at 710, for a brief
discussion of GAAP.
14 1 PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, supra note 10, at AU § 327.11.
15 See A. ARENS & J. LOEBBECKE, supra note 9, at 324; 1 PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS,
supra note 10, at AU § 350.01.
16 See A. ARENS &J. LOEBBECKE, supra note 9, at 140. Because an independent audi-
tor does not review every transaction during an audit, the auditor does not guarantee
the accuracy of the financial statements. See id. at 110; see also Rosenblum v. Adler, 93
NJ. 324, 344, 461 A.2d 138, 148 (1983) (auditor is not required to examine every docu-
ment; audit assurance has limits). Rather, an independent auditor usually attests only
that he performed a GAAS audit and that the financial statements are presented fairly in
accordance with GAAP. This type of audit opinion is known as an "unqualified opin-
ion." 1 PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, supra note 10, at AU § 509.28. Based upon the audit
findings, however, an auditor may be unable to issue an unqualified opinion because of
problems in the financial statements. In these circumstances, an auditor will issue one of
two other types of audit opinions or disclaim an opinion. An auditor may issue a "quali-
fied opinion," stating that the financial statements are presented fairly in accordance
with GAAP "except for" the effects of a material departure from GAAP or a change in
accounting principles or reporting periods, or "subject to" the effects of significant un-
certainties surrounding the financial statements. Id. at AU § 509.29. Alternatively, an
independent auditor may issue an "adverse opinion," stating that the financial state-
ments are not presented fairly in accordance with GAAP. Id. at AU § 509.41. Finally, if
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The audit process itself represents a unique tripartite relation-
ship among the auditor, the corporation, and third parties.
Although the corporation pays for the audit, the auditor's opinion
on the financial statements is designed to facilitate informed finan-
cial decisions by creditors and the investing public. 17 To ensure the
credibility of afidit findings, an auditor must be a disinterested pro-
fessional, maintaining both actual and apparent independence.' 8
An auditor preserves independence by maintaining a detached
mental attitude and avoiding circumstances that the public "might
believe likely to influence independence."' 9 Although the indepen-
dence requirement is designed to prevent auditor bias or public per-
ception of auditor bias in favor of the audited company,
independence does not connote an adversarial relationship between
an auditor and the company. Independence requires auditor impar-
tiality and fairness to the company, the company's creditors, and the
investing public.20
B. Auditing Federal Income Taxes
An important part of the overall examination of a company's
financial statements is the independent auditor's review of the com-
pany's accounting provision and liability for federal income taxes.
Because an IRS audit may revise the amount of federal income tax a
company owes for a year, an independent auditor must evaluate the
financial statement presentation of taxes in light of those potential
additional taxes. 21 Thus, an independent auditor must identify and
an independent auditor's examination is so curtailed or limited that no basis for an opin-
ion exists, a "disclaimer of opinion" is appropriate. Id. at AU § 509.45. A "disclaimer
of opinion" is not an expression of an opinion.
17 Arthur Young, 465 U.S at 817-18. See generally A. ARENS &J. LOEBBECKE, supra note
9, at 5 (auditor fulfills public role by being competent and independent).
18 1 PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, supra note 10, at AU § 220.02-.03.
19 Id. at AU § 220.03.
20 Id. at AU § 220.02.
21 See FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, ACCOUNTING STANDARDS-CUR-
RENT TEXT § C59, at 8301-8317 (1984) [hereinafter cited as FASB ACCOUNTING STAN-
DARDS].
The potential liabilities of a company, such as additional income taxes, are loss con-
tingencies. The accounting treatment of a loss contingency is dependent on how likely
it is that a loss has been incurred and whether the amount of the loss can be reasonably
estimated. Where the likelihood of a loss having been incurred is "probable" and the
amount of the loss can be reasonably estimated, the loss should be reflected in the finan-
cial statements and perhaps disclosed in a note to the statements. Id. § C59.105-.108, at
8302-8303. Where there is a "reasonable possibility" that a loss has been incurred, the
loss contingency should be disclosed in a note to the financial statements. Id.
§ C59.109-.1 10, at 8303. Where the likelihood of a loss having been incurred is less
than reasonably possible, normally the financial statements may be silent regarding the
loss contingency. See id. § C59.113, at 8304 (disclosure of remote loss contingencies
recommended but not required).
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evaluate items and transactions for which the company's tax treat-
ment appears legally uncertain.
Generally, the examination of federal income taxes is more dif-
ficult than the audit of many other accounts and transactions be-
cause an independent auditor must deal with the uncertainty of
potential additional liabilities. 22 Once an independent auditor iden-
tifies items and transactions as areas of uncertainty or "gray areas,"
the auditor must predict the likelihood of the company's incurring
additional taxes on such "gray areas." 23 Further, because these
items and transactions may be scattered throughout the accounting
records, an auditor must be concerned about whether all "gray ar-
eas" have been identified. 24 To satisfy this concern an auditor typi-
cally will perform certain independent procedures designed to
identify "gray areas" and potential assessments of additional tax.25
Although these independent procedures provide some assurance
that all "gray areas" have been identified, GAAS strongly suggests
that an auditor supplement these procedures with two other audit
procedures: discussions with management and correspondence
from the company's attorney. 26
Auditor discussions with management normally include inquiry
about the company's procedures for identifying potential loss items.
The auditor also elicits management's thoughts regarding the exist-
ence of items or transactions that may constitute "gray areas," and
obtains a letter of representation from the company stating that all
potential liabilities have been disclosed to the auditor.27 Corre-
spondence from the company's attorney usually entails securing a
letter describing potential tax liabilities stemming from pending or
threatened tax litigation, IRS tax assessments, or potential tax
claims against the company from each of the company's outside
counsel. 28 These discussions and letters typically allow an auditor
to identify effectively "gray areas" and potential tax liabilities. Both
22 See A. ARENS &J. LOEBBECKE, supra note 9, at 666 ("[I]t is more difficult to dis-
cover unrecorded transactions or events than to properly verify recorded
information.").
23 See FASB AcCOUrTING STANDARDS, supra note 21, § C59.144, at 8313.
24 See 1 PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, supra note 10, at AU § 337.01 (GAAS guidance
on identifying potential losses from litigation, claims, and assessments against com-
pany). See also A. ARENS &J. LOEBBECxE, supra note 9, at 666 ("[T]he primary objective
at the initial stage of the tests [for loss contingencies] is to determine the existence of
contingencies.") (emphasis in original).
25 See A. ARENS &J. LOEBBECKE, supra note 9, at 666-67.
26 1 PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, supra note 10, at AU § 337.05, .09 (management is
primary source of information regarding loss contingencies from litigation, claims, and
assessments; correspondence from outside counsel is primary method of corroborating
information provided by management).
27 See id. at AU § 337.05.
28 See id. at AU § 337.08-.09. For a general discussion of auditor contact with an
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management and attorneys often are familiar with tax planning
strategies and possible tax problems surrounding the company's fi-
nancial transactions. 29
Although disclosure of tax information to an independent audi-
tor may be detrimental ultimately to the company, GAAS requires
that an auditor receive such disclosures to opine on the financial
statements.3 0 If management or outside counsel refuses to disclose
tax information, the auditor may not issue an unqualified opinion on
the financial statements.3' Consequently, an incentive is built into
the audit process for management and outside counsel to provide
an independent auditor with the information necessary to identify
and evaluate all "gray areas" in a company's tax return.
C. Tax Accrual Workpapers
Tax accrual workpapers are the written documentation sup-
porting an independent auditor's examination of a company's ac-
counting provision and liability for income taxes in its financial
statements. Although an independent auditor must document and
support audit findings, GAAS does not prescribe the specific con-
tent of the tax accrual workpapers.3 2 Rather, the extent of docu-
mentation in these workpapers is left to the independent auditor's
professional judgment.33
In a typical audit engagement, tax accrual workpapers will con-
tain most, if not all, of the evidence gathered by an independent
auditor during the review of the client's tax liability. The
workpapers usually delineate, in detail, the specific "gray areas" in a
tax return. The auditor will construct and document a worst case
audited company's outside counsel, see A. ARENS &J. LOEBBECKE, supra note 9, at 666-
71.
29 Traditionally, an independent auditor would both audit the financial statements
of a company and prepare that company's tax returns. Recently, however, companies
have used their auditing firms less as their tax preparer or tax consultant. See, e.g.,
United States v. Coopers & Lybrand, 550 F.2d 615, 617 (10th Cir. 1977) (auditor was
not preparer of tax returns). See also Schnee & Taylor, Summonses of Accountants'
Workpapers: The Fears AreJustified, 43 OHIO CPA J. 115, 118 (1984) (recent survey of eight
largest accounting firms indicates decline of tax planning services by independent audi-
tors for their audit clients). In-house accountants and lawyers, and other accounting or
law firms, now serve as substitutes. Consequently, an independent auditor may not have
knowledge of a company's tax return information outside of the audit process. See Buch-
holz, Tax Accrual File Controversy, 40 INST. ON FED. TAX'N § 37.01, § 37.04, at 37-15
(1982). This structural change places more pressure on the audit process to provide an
auditor with the necessary tax information to opine on financial statements.
30 See 1 PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, supra note 10, at AU §§ 333.11, 337.13, 509.10-
.12. For a brief discussion of audit report modifications because of limitations placed on
an audit by management, see A. ARENS &J. LOEBBECKE, supra note 9, at 706-07.
31 1 PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, supra note 10, at AU § 509.10-.12.
32 Id. at AU § 339.05.
33 Id. at AU § 339.04-.05.
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scenario for tax treatment of these areas to facilitate identification of
the total potential additional tax liabilities for the company.3 4 The
tax accrual workpapers also may include the thoughts of manage-
ment regarding tax items they might litigate, if necessary, and the
dollar amounts at which they would compromise with the IRS.3 5
Thus, tax accrual workpapers often will reveal the company's entire
tax picture, including all sensitive "gray areas" and management
strategies for dealing with the IRS.
II
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF AUDITORS' PRIVILEGE
CONCERNING TAx ACCRUAL WORKPAPERS
For nearly a decade, courts and commentators have disagreed
about whether the IRS should be able to gain access to an independ-
ent auditor's tax accrual workpapers. 36 Because of the sensitive in-
formation that tax accrual workpapers typically contain, they are of
great interest to the IRS, corporate managers, and independent au-
ditors. The IRS seeks access to tax accrual workpapers because they
provide a detailed description of the "gray areas" on a company's
tax return.37 Quick identification of these areas and reliable infor-
mation regarding a taxpayer's negotiating position are useful to the
IRS. Corporate managers, on the other hand, wish to deny the IRS
34 See Arthur Young, 465 U.S. at 812 ("auditor often engages in a 'worst-case' analy-
sis"); Caplin, Government Access to Independent Accountants' Tax Accrual Workpapers, 1 VA. TAx
REV. 57, 61 (1982) (tax accrual workpapers contain "item-by-item evaluation of the tax-
payer's potential exposure to additional tax liability"); Garbis & Rubin, Implications of the
Sup. Ct. 's Holding of No Accountant's Privilege in Arthur Young, 60J. TAX'N 342 (1984) ("audi-
tor's 'worst case' analysis ... documented fully in the tax accrual workpapers").
35 See Garbis & Rubin, supra note 34, at 342 (tax accrual workpapers contain "po-
tential litigation and settlement positions of the taxpayer"). See also Caplin, supra note
34, at 60 n.14 (tax accrual workpapers may include information regarding possible fu-
ture settlements or litigation with IRS).
36 Compare United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1982) (ac-
cess prohibited), affd in part, rev'd in part, 465 U.S. 805 (1984); United States v. Coopers
& Lybrand, 550 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1977) (same); Caplin, supra note 34, at 83 (IRS
access to tax accrual workpapers should be avoided except in extraordinary circum-
stances), with In re Newton, 718 F.2d 1015 (11 th Cir. 1983) (access permitted), cert. denied
sub nom. Trio Mfg. Co. v. United States, 466 U.S. 904 (1984); United States v. Arthur
Andersen & Co., 474 F. Supp. 322 (D. Mass.) (same), appeal dismissed as moot, 612 F.2d
569 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1021 (1980); Nath, Internal Revenue Service Sum-
mons for "Sensitive"Accountants'Papers, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1561, 1622 (1981) (Disclosure of
tax accrual workpapers is "not undesirable result" because taxpayer owes duty to pay all
legally owed taxes.).
37 See Brief for the United States at 25-27, Arthur Young, 465 U.S. 805 (1984) (pri-
mary purpose of the IRS's gaining access to tax accrual workpapers is to obtain a concise
organization of relevant facts surrounding "gray area" items on tax returns). See also
Caplin, Should the Service be Permitted to Reach Accountants' Tax Accrual Hl'orkpapers 51 J.
TAx'N 194, 199 (1979) (tax accrual workpapers provide "roadmap" to IRS regarding
".gray areas" in tax return).
700 [Vol. 71:694
AUDITORS' PRIVILEGE
access to tax accrual workpapers because they believe that a funda-
mental unfairness results in their negotiations with the IRS. 38 In-
dependent auditors fear that IRS access to tax accrual workpapers
endangers the integrity of client-auditor communications and
thereby threatens the audit process.3 9 Auditors argue that an im-
paired audit process increases the risk that independent auditors
may not detect materially misstated financial statements. Such state-
ments would mislead investors and creditors, thus damaging the
public securities and private capital markets.40
Prior to Arthur Young,41 courts agreed on an overall test for al-
lowing an IRS summons under section 7602, but disagreed about
whether attempts to obtain tax accrual workpapers could meet the
test.42 As formulated by the Supreme Court, the test has two sepa-
rate parts. First, in United States v. Powell,43 the Supreme Court held
that an IRS summons will be enforced only if the IRS shows that its
investigation has a legitimate purpose, that it has followed the pro-
cedural requirements of the Code, that it does not already have the
information sought from the taxpayer or third party, and that "the
inquiry may be relevant to the [legitimate] purpose. '44
Most litigation involving the Powell requirements focused on the
last two items: duplicative information and relevancy. Taxpayers
and independent auditors repeatedly attempted to deny the IRS ac-
cess to tax accrual workpapers by asserting that the IRS was request-
ing duplicative information because the IRS already had in its
possession the information contained in the workpapers. Courts
uniformly rejected these contentions, finding either that the dupli-
cative information limitation refers to documents, and not to the in-
formation contained within the documents, or that the limitation
does not preclude the IRS from examining workpapers to check the
38 See Arthur Young, 677 F.2d at 220 (IRS access to tax accrual workpapers "puts the
taxpayer-corporation at a substantial disadvantage when it is audited."). See also Garbis
& Rubin, supra note 34, at 342 (IRS access to tax accrual workpapers provides an "ad-
vantage [to the IRS] in the resolution of the issues raised in [an IRS] audit.").
39 See Brief Amici Curiae of Arthur Andersen & Co., Alexander Grant & Co., Coopers
& Lybrand, Deloitte Haskins & Sells, Ernst & Whinney, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.,
Price Waterhouse & Co., Seidman & Seidman and Touche Ross & Co. in Support of
Respondents at 6, Arthur Young, 465 U.S. 805 (1984) (IRS access to tax accrual
workpapers "may lessen the candor with which the client communicates with the in-
dependent auditor and thus compromise the effectiveness of the audit function.").
40 See id. at 6 n.3. See also Buchholz, supra note 29, § 37.06, at 37-20 ("A decline in
quality auditing would erode the integrity of financial reporting and poorly serve
investors.").
41 465 U.S. 805 (1984).
42 See cases cited supra note 36.
43 379 U.S. 48 (1964).
44 Id. at 57-58.
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reliability of information already in its possession. 45
Challenges to IRS access based upon a lack of relevancy proved
more troublesome for courts, and ultimately resulted in two differ-
ent judicial readings of section 7602. In United States v. Coopers &
Lybrand,46 the Tenth Circuit held that tax accrual workpapers were
not relevant under section 7602 where they were not prepared in
connection with a tax return filing.4 7 Because an auditor prepares
tax accrual workpapers principally for an audit, and not for tax re-
turn preparation, the Tenth Circuit's narrow reading of relevancy
effectively eliminated IRS access in most instances. No other court,
however, followed the Tenth Circuit's reading of section 7602.48
Rather, these courts construed relevancy very broadly, finding tax
accrual workpapers relevant under section 7602 because they may
highlight questionable positions taken on tax returns.49
The Supreme Court noted a second set of limitations on the
IRS summons power under section 7602 in United States v. Euge.50
The Euge Court stated that the IRS must show that disclosure of the
information sought is not forbidden by either a federal statute or
"substantial countervailing policies." 51 The Court did not define
"substantial countervailing policies" beyond implying that it encom-
passed "traditional privileges and limitations. ' 52
Prior to Euge, lower courts had rejected an independent auditor
workpaper privilege or work product exception to section 7602. 53
The Second Circuit, however, in Arthur Young, recognized a "work
product privilege" 54 for the tax accrual workpapers of an independ-
45 See, e.g., United States v. Noall, 587 F.2d 123, 125 n.2 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
441 U.S. 923 (1979); United States v. Price Waterhouse & Co., 515 F. Supp. 996, 999
(N.D. Ill. 1981); United States v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 474 F. Supp. 322, 330 (D.
Mass.), appeal dismissed as moot, 612 F.2d 569 (lst Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1021
(1980).
46 550 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1977).
47 Id. at 621. Cf. United States v. Matras, 487 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1973) (corporate
budgets not relevant to issue of liability for taxes).
48 See, e.g., In re Newton, 718 F.2d 1015, 1018-20 (lth Cir. 1983) ("relevancy"
extends beyond source documents for tax return to include any document that may be
useful), cert. denied sub nom. Trio Mfg. Co. v. United States, 466 U.S. 904 (1984); United
States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 536-37 (5th Cir. 1982) (two to one decision) (same)
(dictum), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 944 (1984); United States v. Price Waterhouse & Co., 515
F. Supp. 996, 999-1000 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (same).
49 See cases cited supra note 48.
50 444 U.S. 707 (1980).
51 Id. at 711.
52 Id. at 714 (tax summons remains "subject to the traditional privileges and limita-
tions"). See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 398 (1981) (citing Euge for defi-
nition of "substantial countervailing policies").
53 See, e.g., United States v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 474 F. Supp. 322, 327 (D.
Mass.), appeal dismissed as moot, 612 F.2d 569 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1021
(1980); United States v. Kelly, 311 F. Supp. 1216, 1217 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
54 The doctrines of privilege and work product are two separate legal concepts. A
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ent auditor.5 5 The court believed that such a privilege was neces-
sary to protect the integrity of the public securities market.5 6
Without the privilege, the court reasoned that a publicly held corpo-
ration faces a no-win situation: either the company discloses all sen-
sitive tax information to its independent auditor, thereby
prejudicing its negotiating position with the IRS in tax liability dis-
putes, or it withholds information from its independent auditor,
thus impairing the audit process and jeopardizing the reliability of
the financial statements available to investors. 57 Other courts re-
jected this reasoning, finding that such fears were unwarranted or
that the decision to accord a work product privilege was one for
Congress, not the courts. 58
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in United States v. Arthur
Young & Co.-5 9 to resolve the conflicts among the lower courts over
the application of section 7602 to tax accrual workpapers.
III
UNITED STATES V ARTHUR YOUNG & CO.
In 1971, Amerada Hess Corporation (Amerada Hess), a pub-
licly held corporation, engaged Arthur Young & Co. (Arthur
Young), a firm of certified public accountants, to perform annual
audits of its financial statements. Pursuant to federal securities laws,
Amerada Hess filed its financial statements, accompanied by Arthur
Young's audit opinions, with the SEC.6 0 In the course of examining
privilege is "an exception to the general liability of every person to give testimony upon
all acts inquired of in a court ofjustice." J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON
LAW § 2285, at 527 (1961). In short, a privilege is a testimonial right which allows par-
ties in relationships such as attorney-client and husband-wife to avoid disclosing confi-
dential communications in court. See id. § 2285, at 528, § 2321, at 629-30, § 2327, at
634-35. In contrast, the work product doctrine, a more recent invention, is not a per se
testimonial right. Although designed partly to foster attorney-client communications,
the work product doctrine protects directly the work produced by an attorney in prepa-
ration for litigation. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
For clarity and uniformity, this Note employs the term "work product privilege" to
identify the tax accrual workpaper exception created by the Second Circuit. This is the
same term used by the Second Circuit. Arthur Young, 677 F.2d at 221.
55 Arthur Young, 677 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1982).
56 Id. at 219-21. See infra notes 69-78 and accompanying text.
57 677 F.2d at 220-21.
58 See, e.g., In re Newton, 718 F.2d 1015, 1020-21 (11th Cir. 1983) (absent congres-
sional action IRS access permissible), cert. denied sub nom. Trio Mfg. Co. v. United States,
466 U.S 904 (1984); United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 544-45 (5th Cir. 1982)
(fear of impaired audit process merely speculative; if problem exists, Congress is proper
vehicle for change) (dictum), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 944 (1984).
59 459 U.S. 1199 (1983).
60 For a description of filings with the SEC, see supra notes 5-8 and accompanying
text. See generally L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 487-90 (1983) (de-
scription of annual, quarterly, and current reports required of publicly held companies
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the financial statements of Amerada Hess, Arthur Young created
and maintained tax accrual workpapers.
In 1976, publicity erupted over American companies' making
questionable payments to foreign government officials. 61 In re-
sponse to this publicity, Amerada Hess created a special committee
to investigate whether its employees had committed any such acts.
The special committee engaged Arthur Young and a law firm as in-
dependent investigators. Although the special committee found
only minor instances of wrongdoing, the IRS instituted a criminal
probe of Amerada Hess's tax returns for the years 1972 through
1974. This criminal investigation, accompanied by a routine IRS
civil audit already in progress, prompted the IRS to issue a sum-
mons to Arthur Young pursuant to section 7602. The IRS re-
quested various documents, including Arthur Young's tax accrual
workpapers for the years 1972 to 1974. Arthur Young refused to
comply with the IRS summons.
At a proceeding to enforce the IRS summons, the federal dis-
trict court found no federal statutory authority prohibiting disclo-
sure of the requested documents and refused to create a privilege
for independent auditors.62 The court found that the IRS had satis-
fied the Powell test for Arthur Young's audit workpapers, including
its tax accrual workpapers, and accordingly, enforced that part of
the summons. 63
On appeal, Arthur Young and Amerada Hess64 sought to re-
verse the district court's holding regarding the tax accrual
under Securities Exchange Act of 1934). For discussion of audit opinions, see supra note
16.
61 See R. HAMILTON, CORPORATIONS INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED PART-
NERSHIPS, CASES AND MATERIALS 514-15 (2d ed. 1981) (legacy of Watergate was disclo-
sure by approximately 400 corporations of illegal domestic political campaign
contributions and "commissions" or bribes to overseas officials).
In 1977, Congress enacted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, making it
illegal for corporations or their employees to pay bribes to foreign officials or foreign
political parties to gain business opportunities. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977,
Pub. L. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1496 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78 dd-2 (1982)).
62 Arthur Young, 496 F. Supp. 1152, 1156-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
63 Id. at 1157-58.
The district court refused to enforce the IRS summons covering Arthur Young's
audit program (a master document detailing audit procedures) and documents prepared
by the special committee. The court found the audit program irrelevant under Powell
and the special committee documents protected by the attorney work product doctrine.
Id.
64 The parties were joined by 11 amici curiae including the AICPA and the account-
ing firms of Arthur Andersen & Co., Alexander Grant & Co., Coopers & Lybrand,
Deloitte Haskins & Sells, Ernst & Whinney, Laventhol & Horwath, Peat, Marwick, Mitch-
ell & Co., Price Waterhouse & Co., Seidman & Seidman, and Touche Ross & Co. With
the exception of Laventhol & Horwath, these amici curiae, accompanied by The Com-
mittee on Corporate Law Departments of the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York, the El Paso Company, the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, and the
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workpapers on a number of grounds. In response to a challenge of
"relevancy," the Second Circuit found that the tax accrual
workpapers were relevant to a proper IRS investigation. 65 Rejecting
the Tenth Circuit's reasoning in Coopers & Lybrand, 66 the court en-
dorsed a broad reading of relevancy. Under section 7602, the court
stated, relevance means whether the documents sought may "throw
'light upon' the correctness of the return." 67 The court concluded
that an independent auditor's tax accrual workpapers would indeed
illuminate a tax return. 68
The circuit court was more responsive to arguments based on
fundamental unfairness and detriment to the public securities sys-
tem. The court noted that the Securities Exchange Act of 193469
requires an annual audit of all publicly held corporations and that
these audits are one of the key safeguards of the securities laws. 70
The court recognized that a free flow of information from a com-
pany to an independent auditor is necessary to protect the reliability
of audit reports. 71 This free flow of information becomes critical
when an auditor deals with tax liabilities because an auditor must
pinpoint and document all items of uncertainty. 72 Given the sensi-
tivity of such tax information, the court concluded that "a prudent
organization might not be perfectly candid with independent audi-
tors once it knew that the information revealed [to auditors] would
be reachable [by the IRS] under § 7602." 73
The court stated that IRS access to tax accrual workpapers cre-
ates "a clash between two important congressional policies": en-
forcement of tax laws and protection of investors in the securities
market.74 The court balanced these interests and concluded that
protection of investors generally prevails over tax enforcement with
regard to tax accrual workpapers for publicly held corporations.
The court reasoned that although a privilege for tax accrual
workpapers may result in some loss of operational efficiency to the
IRS, investors will avoid "the 'grave dangers of inaccuracy and un-
Tax Executive Institute, Inc., also filed amicus curiae briefs with the Supreme Court
supporting the position of Arthur Young.
65 Arthur Young, 677 F.2d at 218-19.
66 550 F.2d 615, 618-21 (10th Cir. 1977). See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying
text.
67 677 F.2d at 219.
68 Id.
69 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 12(b)(1)(J)-(L), 15 U.S.C. § 78 l(b)(1)(J)-(L)
(1982).
70 677 F.2d at 219. See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text.
71 677 F.2d at 219-20.
72 Id. at 220. For a description of the audit of federal income taxes, see supra notes
21-31 and accompanying text.
73 677 F.2d at 220 (footnote omitted).
74 Id. at 219-20.
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trustworthiness' "in financial statements resulting from an impaired
audit system.75
Capitalizing on the second Euge limitation, "substantial coun-
tervailing policies," the court then carved out an independent audi-
tor work product privilege. The court held that in general the
privilege precludes the IRS from gaining access to an independent
auditor's tax accrual workpapers created in an audit of a publicly
held corporation. 76 The court, however, added that it would permit
access to these workpapers in two situations: where the IRS alleges
fraud by the corporate taxpayer or where the IRS shows a true need
for the workpapers, such as where corporate records have been de-
stroyed. 77 Because the IRS had not alleged fraud against Amerada
Hess and could not show a true need for the workpapers, the Sec-
ond Circuit denied access to Arthur Young's tax accrual
workpapers. 78 Faced with this adverse ruling the government peti-
tioned for and received review of the case in the United States
Supreme Court on a writ of certiorari. 79
The Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit's holding that
the tax accrual workpapers were relevant under the Powell standard
but reversed the lower court's finding that a work product privilege
precluded IRS access to the workpapers.80 The Court endorsed the
broad reach of IRS summonses under section 7602, stating that
"Congress has endowed the IRS with expansive information-gather-
ing authority; § 7602 is the centerpiece of that congressional de-
sign."8 1 Noting the clear language of section 7602, the Court
quickly disposed of the relevancy argument. The use of the lan-
guage "may be relevant," rather than "is relevant," in section 7602
"reflects Congress' express intention to allow the IRS to obtain
items of even potential relevance."8 2 The court concluded that "tax
accrual workpapers . ..are .. .highly relevant to legitimate IRS
inquiry" because such workpapers illuminate questionable positions
taken on tax returns.8 3
The Court next considered whether "substantial countervailing
policies" necessitated the judicial creation of a privilege for an in-
dependent auditor's tax accrual workpapers. The Court noted that
75 Id. at 221 (quoting Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947)).
76 Id. at 221. The circuit court did not address the issue of whether such a work
product privilege would extend to audits of privately held companies. For discussion of
this issue, see infra notes 167-72 and accompanying text.
77 677 F.2d at 221 & n.10.
78 Id. at 221.
79 459 U.S. 1199 (1983).
80 465 U.S. 805, 821 (1984).
81 Id. at 816.
82 Id. at 814 (emphasis in original).
83 Id. at 815.
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the Second Circuit's work product privilege actually resembled an
accountant-client testimonial privilege because the purpose of the
exception was to protect client-auditor communications.84 Such a
testimonial privilege, the Court stated, does not exist in federal law.
In Couch v. United States,85 the Court had rejected a federal account-
ant-client testimonial privilege. To the extent that the circuit court's
privilege was nontestimonial, reflecting a work product doctrine ori-
gin, the Court found the relationship between the Second Circuit's
privilege and the work product doctrine unpersuasive. The Court
reasoned that the work product doctrine's protection of an attor-
ney's work product is premised on the role of an attorney as a "cli-
ent's confidential advisor and advocate . ..whose duty it is to
present the client's case in the most favorable possible light."8 6 In
contrast, the Court stated, an independent auditor has an overriding
public responsibility, extending to the creditors and stockholders of
the corporation and to the investing public. 87 This public responsi-
bility requires an independent auditor to perform an audit with
complete mental independence from the audited company.88 The
Court concluded that to protect an independent auditor's tax ac-
crual workpapers "would be to ignore the significance of the [audi-
tor's] role as a disinterested analyst charged with public
obligations." 8 9
The Court emphasized that the language of section 7602 clearly
reflects the purpose and intent of Congress. "[The. . .language
of § 7602 reflects. . . a congressional policy choice in favor of disclo-
sure of all information relevant to a legitimate IRS inquiry." 90 Given
the clear language and intent of Congress in section 7602, the Court
stated that "[w]hile § 7602 is 'subject to the traditional privileges
and limitations,'" courts should be circumspect in creating new
privileges that would limit IRS power under section 7602.91 The
Court concluded that "[i]f the broad latitude granted to the IRS by
§ 7602 is to be circumscribed, that is a choice for Congress, and not
this Court, to make." 92
The Supreme Court supported its refusal to grant a privilege
for an independent auditor's tax accrual workpapers with three pub-
84 Id. at 817-18; see supra note 54 for a comparison of privileges and the work prod-
uct doctrine.
85 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
86 465 U.S. at 817.
87 Id.
88 Id. For a description of the independence requirement for auditors in audit en-
gagements, see supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
89 465 U.S. at 818.
90 Id. at 816 (emphasis in original).
91 Id. (quoting United States v. Euge, 444 U.S. 707, 714 (1980)).
92 Id. at 816-17 (citation omitted).
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lic policy arguments: self-verification of the audit process, appear-
ance of auditor independence, and fundamental fairness. First, the
Court stated that the lack of an auditor privilege will not harm the
public securities market because the audit process is self-verifying.93
Faced with independent auditors' insistence on disclosure of all in-
formation regarding taxes, executives of publicly held corporations
"would not risk a qualified evaluation of [the company's] financial
posture to afford cover for questionable positions reflected in a
prior tax return." 94 Second, the Court perceived that an auditor
privilege would impair the audit process by creating an impression
that the auditor was an advocate of the company.95 The Court
stated that "[i]ndeed, rather than protecting the investing public
. . . insulation of tax accrual workpapers from disclosure might well
undermine the public's confidence in the independent auditing pro-
cess."' 96 Third, the Court rejected the assertion that fundamental
fairness required a privilege for tax accrual workpapers. 97 The
Court noted that other parties, such as the SEC and private litigants,
may obtain tax accrual workpapers. Reasoning that if a private liti-
gant in securities litigation may obtain these workpapers when little
or no public interest is involved, the court stated that "no sound
reason exists" for not allowing the IRS access to the same
workpapers when the public interest of revenue collection is impli-
cated.98 Moreover, the Court added, the IRS had announced a pol-
icy of self-restraint in requesting tax accrual workpapers. 99 This
self-restraint, the Court concluded, "further refutes respondents'
fairness argument and reflects an administrative flexibility that rein-
forces our decision not to reduce irrevocably the § 7602 summons
power." 100
IV
POLICY REASONS FOR AND AGAINST AN AUDITOR
PRIVILEGE REGARDING TAX ACCRUAL
WORKPAPERS
The Supreme Court's holding in Arthur Young reflects the
Court's reluctance to limit IRS power under section 7602 absent a
93 Id. at 818-19.
94 Id. (footnote omitted); see supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text (discussing
the theoretical self-verification of audits of federal income taxes).
95 465 U.S. at 819-20 n.15.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 820-21.
98 Id. at 820.
99 Id. at 820-2 1. For a description of the IRS policy of self-restraint, see infra notes
134-39 and accompanying text.
100 465 U.S. at 821.
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clear expression of congressional intent. The Court's policy justifi-
cations for rejecting an auditor privilege, however, are unpersua-
sive. Closely examined, policy concerns lead to the opposite
conclusion that some form of privilege should be accorded an in-
dependent auditor's tax accrual workpapers.
A. The Self-Verifying Audit Process
The Arthur Young Court stated that the danger of diminished
auditor-client communication resulting in the absence of an auditor
privilege would be offset by the self-verifying nature of the audit
process. The Court noted that if corporate officials withhold infor-
mation necessary for an auditor to examine tax expense and liability
accounts adequately, the auditor will not issue an unqualified audit
opinion on the financial statements. 10 1 The absence of an unquali-
fied opinion immediately warns creditors and investors that some
material problems may exist in the financial statements.10 2 Further-
more, the SEC will not accept a qualified opinion or disclaimer of
opinion if it results from a limitation placed on the audit by corpo-
rate management.' 0 3 Accordingly, the Court concluded that
"[r]esponsible corporate management would not risk a qualified
evaluation" by withholding information from an independent audi-
tor regarding tax items. 10 4
In theory, the Court is correct to conclude that the audit pro-
cess is self-verifying and that responsible management will not risk
receiving a detrimental audit opinion by withholding sensitive tax
information from its independent auditor. In practice, however, the
Court's analysis is unpersuasive for two reasons. First, the Court
assumed that the quality of client-auditor communications would not
diminish because of IRS access to tax accrual workpapers. Second,
the Court further assumed that if the quality of communications did
diminish, an auditor would be able to recognize this occurrence. If
these two assumptions prove untrue, the public securities system
may suffer damage because of an increased risk that investors will
receive materially misstated financial statements.
The Second Circuit as well as numerous commentators have ex-
pressed concern that the quality of client-auditor communications
will be impaired once the IRS begins to request tax accrual
workpapers. 10 5 Because tax accrual workpapers identify all "gray-
101 Id. at 818.
102 See A. ARENS &J. LOEBBECKE, supra note 9, at 701.
103 See L. Loss, supra note 60, at 1267; Buchholz & Moraglio, IRS Access to Auditors'
Work Papers: The Supreme Court Decision-A Measured Response is Called Fo; J. Accr., Sept.
1984, at 91, 96.
104 Arthur Young, 465 U.S. at 819.
105 See, e.g., Arthur Young, 677 F.2d at 220 (prudent management may not be "per-
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areas" in a corporation's tax return and emphasize the weak points
of tax positions, corporate managers and their advisers will fear that
IRS access may become a "self-fulfilling prophecy" in IRS audits.10 6
To avoid this adverse result, corporate managers and their advisers
may become less willing to disclose tax information to an independ-
ent auditor than they would be otherwise.' 0 7 If management or
their advisers become guarded with information about tax items, an
independent auditor, recognizing this occurrence, will issue a quali-
fied opinion or disclaim an opinion on the affected financial state-
ments.' 08 The auditor's reaction to diminished communications is
the essence of the self-verification rationale advanced by the
Supreme Court.
In order for self-verification to work, however, an auditor must
recognize the diminished communication by management or their
advisers. Auditor recognition of impaired communications may be
difficult for two reasons. First, the diminished communications
rarely will be an outright withholding of information by manage-
ment or outside counsel. Rather, the impairment will manifest itself
as a general reluctance to volunteer information or to speak
freely.' 0 9 Second, because the audit of income taxes involves assess-
fectly candid" with auditor if IRS can reach such communications); Brief of American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants as Amicus Curiae at 29, Arthur Young, 465 U.S.
805 (1984) (depth and quality of communications from corporations and their tax advis-
ers to auditors will suffer if the IRS gains access to tax accrual workpapers). See also
Caplin, supra note 34, at 81-82 ("[clandid communication between accountant and client
is at stake" if IRS obtains tax accrual workpapers); M. SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE 8.06[3][b], at 8-37 (1981) (management and its advisers may not commu-
nicate openly with auditors because tax accrual workpapers indicate all possible weak-
nesses in tax return). But see Nath, supra note 36, at 1592-93 (SEC reporting
requirements will counter management's inclination to withhold sensitive tax informa-
tion from auditors).
106 M. SALTZMAN, supra note 105, 8.06[3][b], at 8-37 ("Production of [tax accrual]
workpapers creates the obvious hazard that the amount reserved in the exercise of the
auditor's conservative judgment will become a self-fulfilling prophecy by way of the rev-
enue agent's adjustment. Clients and their advisers might not communicate openly with
auditors if tax adjustments will be the result.").
107 One amicus curiae in Arthur Young expressed the probable reaction of corporate
managers and their advisers if the IRS obtains tax accrual workpapers:
If a person feels secure that his statement will be held in confidence, he
will speak much more expansively and fully than he would otherwise. An
audit client or [that client's] attorney who is concerned that the client's
confidence to his auditor will be scrutinized by the IRS will be much more
guarded with his information than otherwise, and the auditor will learn
much less.
BriefAmicus Curiae of The Committee on Corporate Law Departments of the Association
of the Bar of the City of New York at 7, Arthur Young, 465 U.S. 805 (1984).
108 See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
109 See Brief Amicus Curiae of The Committee on Corporate Law Departments of the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York at 7, Arthur Young, 465 U.S. 805 ("audit
client ... will be much more guarded with his information than otherwise"); M. SALTZ-
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ing potential liabilities, an auditor does not have a complete in-
dependent source of information from which to judge the
completeness or degree of detail of client disclosures."I0 Moreover,
an auditor cannot rely completely on other audit procedures to de-
termine whether a client has disclosed all "gray-areas" and potential
tax liabilities. These procedures test only certain parts of the com-
pany's books and records where an auditor believes potential tax
liabilities may exist."' Although these procedures provide some
audit evidence regarding the existence of "gray areas," they are not
comprehensive."12
Presently, it is uncertain whether a denial of privilege for tax
accrual workpapers actually will reduce auditor-client communica-
tion and impair the flow of reliable information to public investors.
Denial of a privilege, however, does raise the possibility of such
damage." 3 A grant of a privilege for tax accrual workpapers, on the
MAN, supra note 105, 8.06[3][b], at 8-37 ("Clients and their advisers might not commu-
nicate openly with auditors .... ").
The problem of client reluctance to volunteer information is compounded by the
historical friction between independent auditors, on one side, and attorneys, on the
other side. Attorneys often are reluctant to disclose information to an independent au-
ditor because they fear that disclosure will bring about the losses they desire to avoid.
See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STATEMENT OF POLICY REGARDING LAWYERS' RESPONSES
TO AUDITORS' REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION (preamble) (Dec. 1975), reprinted in 1 PROFES-
SIONAL STANDARDS, supra note 10, (Exhibit II) at AU § 337C (critical of attorney disclo-
sures to auditor because such disclosures "might become public and precipitate a loss to
or possible liability of the [company] that might otherwise never materialize") [hereinaf-
ter cited as LAWYERS' RESPONSES]; A. ARENS &J. LOEBBECKE, supra note 9, at 668 (reluc-
tance of attorneys to disclose information to auditor because "inclusion of the
information in a footnote [to the financial statements] could actually cause the lawsuit
[an attorney desires to avoid]"). Attorneys express further reluctance to disclose infor-
mation to an independent auditor because they believe disclosure may be "destructive
of free and open communication and early consultation between lawyer and client."
LAWYERS' RESPONSES (preamble), supra.
1 10 See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text. See also Note, Creation of an Account-
ant Work-Product Privilegefor Tax Accrual Workpapers. United States v. Arthur Young & Co.,
68 MARQ. L. REV. 155, 171 (1984) ("an auditor who does not know [that certain tax loss
contingencies] exist cannot know [that such] information is missing").
11I See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
112 See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text.
113 Whether audit clients and their attorneys become more guarded with informa-
tion regarding "gray area" tax positions in the absence of an auditor privilege is a ques-
tion that will be answered over time. Assuming that the Supreme Court is correct in
concluding that IRS access to tax accrual workpapers ultimately will not affect the quality
of financial reporting in the public securities system, this still does not prove that a privi-
lege should not be accorded for the other policy reasons set forth in this Note. The self-
verification argument, if valid, does not prove that a privilege would damage the audit
process; it simply negates the assertion that the absence of a privilege for tax accrual
workpapers will damage the audit process and, in turn, the public securities system. In
such circumstances, the public policy factor of protection of the public securities system
becomes neutral in the determination of whether to accord a privilege for tax accrual
workpapers.
One other possible private sector response to Arthur Young is that auditors may
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other hand, will remove this risk of damage because management
and counsel communications to an auditor will be insulated from
the IRS, thereby fostering an environment conducive to full and free
communication.
B. Auditor Independence
The Court noted in Arthur Young that "insulation of tax accrual
workpapers from disclosure [to the IRS] might well undermine the
public's confidence in the independent auditing process" because a
privilege may affect adversely the public's perception of an auditor's
independence.' 14 The Court speculated that a privilege would cre-
ate the appearance of an auditor as an advocate of the company.
This appearance, the Court concluded, would destroy the public
perception of auditor impartiality and thereby threaten the "value of
the audit function itself."' 1 5
The Court is correct to identify the potential for the appearance
of impaired auditor independence if the public views an auditor as
an advocate of the company. The purpose of a privilege for tax ac-
crual workpapers, however, should reduce the risk of public mis-
perception. The purpose of the privilege is to remove the
unfairness resulting from IRS access to these workpapers and
thereby protect the reliability of information available to public in-
vestors. 116 As this Note will discuss subsequently, removal of this
unfairness by granting a privilege will also help preserve the self-
assessed taxing structure and avoid increased tax litigation by cor-
porate taxpayers.11 7  Although a privilege for tax accrual
workpapers will benefit corporations by protecting their negotiating
and litigating positions in tax disputes, the public perception of au-
ditor independence should remain unchanged. The public should
view the privilege as a protection designed to serve noncorporate
public goals and not as a tool implemented by auditors and compa-
nies to advance corporate interests.
Further, twenty states have enacted some form of statutory pro-
tection for confidential communications in accountant-client rela-
avoid detailing everything in the tax accrual workpapers. Auditors may evaluate the ca-
pacity of company tax personnel, review "gray areas" using company documentation,
and place only a general memorandum in the workpapers. Although this approach elim-
inates the "roadmap" effect of the tax accrual workpapers, it raises questions of im-
paired auditor independence. The public may view such adjustment of tax accrual
workpaper content as a subterfuge, giving rise to at least the appearance of diminished
independence. See generally supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
114 465 U.S at 819-20 n.15.
115 Id.
116 See supra notes 101-12 and accompanying text. But see supra note 113.
117 See infrd notes 140-56 & 157-62 and accompanying text.
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tions which include audits.' 18 One state, Illinois, employs broad
statutory language that protects all communications originating dur-
ing the professional relationship of an accountant and client."19
The remaining nineteen state statutes protect accountant-client
communications but include one or more exceptions that, for exam-
ple, require disclosure in criminal or bankruptcy proceedings or
when commanded by a court subpoena. 120 Although these provi-
sions vary in scope and degree of protection, they indicate that
protection of accountant-client communications at the state level
apparently has not impaired public perception of auditor
independence.
The Supreme Court believed that a privilege for tax accrual
workpapers might impair public confidence in the audit process by
creating an impression of an auditor as an advocate of the company.
Denial of a privilege for tax accrual workpapers, however, may im-
pair public confidence in the audit process by creating an impres-
sion that the auditor is an adversary of the company. According to
GAAS, "independence does not imply the attitude of a prosecutor,
but rather a judicial impartiality."' 121 An independent auditor
should be an impartial professional, neither favoring nor disfavor-
ing the company. 122 Allowing IRS access to tax accrual workpapers
may create a public perception of an auditor as a supplemental en-
118 The 20 states that have enacted some form of statutory protection for confiden-
tial communications between accountant and client are: Arizona, Florida, Georgia,
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri,
Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, and
Washington. See generally Note, Government Access to Corporate Documents and Auditors'
Workpapers: Shall We Include Auditors Among the Privileged Few?, 2 J. CORP. L. 349, 368-72
(1977) (survey of state testimonial privileges for accountant-client relationship in mid-
1970s).
119 Act ofJuly 22, 1943, Laws 1943, § 27, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111, § 5533 (Smith-
Hurd 1978) ("A public accountant shall not be required by any court to divulge informa-
tion or evidence which has been obtained by him in his confidential capacity as a public
accountant.").
120 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-749 (West Supp. 1985) (protection of ac-
countant-client communications except in criminal and bankruptcy proceedings or
where court subpoena commands disclosure); GA. CODE ANN. § 84-220(b) (Supp. 1982)
(protection of accountant-client communications except, for example, where dispute
over accounting services, or where peer review by other accountants or professional
organizations); MD. GTs. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-110 (1984) (protection of account-
ant-client communications except in criminal and bankruptcy proceedings); MICH.
COMp. LAWS ANN. § 339.713 (West Supp. 1985) (protection of accountant-client com-
munications except, for example, where waived by client, or where part of defense in
court action or administrative hearing); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 9.1 la (Purdon Supp.
1985) (protection of accountant-client communications except for disclosures in court,
accountant disciplinary action, or legal actions against accountant regarding profes-
sional services).
121 1 PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, supra note 10, at AU § 220.02; see supra notes 17-20
and accompanying text.
122 1 PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, supra note 10, at AU § 220.02.
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forcement arm of the IRS because access forces the auditor to dis-
close information detrimental to the company.' 23 The change in an
auditor's role from impartial professional to company adversary
may damage public confidence in the audit process. If an auditor
appears to be an adversary of the company, the public may question
the credibility of audit findings. 124
C. Fundamental Fairness
The Supreme Court rejected the assertion by Arthur Young
and Amerada Hess that fundamental fairness required creation of a
privilege for tax accrual workpapers. 125 The parties had argued that
allowing the IRS access to tax accrual workpapers is unfair because
it provides the IRS with a complete preview of a corporate tax-
payer's position in negotiating and litigating tax disputes. 126 The
Court cited the access to tax accrual workpapers by others and the
IRS policy of self-restraint in rejecting the fundamental fairness ar-
gument. On balance, neither of these reasons offsets the unfairness
resulting from IRS access to tax accrual workpapers. In fact, the
Court did not adequately consider the ramifications of the funda-
mental unfairness of IRS access. If left unabated, this unfairness
may erode public confidence in the fairness of federal taxing and
have a detrimental effect on the self-assessed taxing structure. 127
123 See Caplin, supra note 37, at 199-200. Cf. SEC v. Arthur Young & Co., 590 F.2d
785, 788 (9th Cir. 1979) (SEC cannot conscript auditors to do agency task).
124 See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text. Critics of the accounting profes-
sion question whether the major accounting firms are independent of their audit clients.
Much criticism centers on the "other services," such as tax and management consulting,
that these accounting firms often perform for their major audit clients. Critics charge
that auditors' financial ties to their clients through these "other services" impair the
independence of auditors.
A prominent critic of the accounting profession, Professor Abraham Briloff,
summed up the criticism aptly:
The owner of a closely held enterprise was desirous of going pub-
lic .. . .
... As the partner of each [major accounting] firm was interviewed,
he was asked, "What does 2 plus 2 equal?" Each of the respondents re-
plied "Four, of course"-that is, all but the one from the lucky [firm that
got the audit engagement]. His answer, after some serious reflection,
was, "What number did you have in mind?"
A. BRILOFF, UNACCOUNTABLE ACCOUNTING 1-2 (1972).
Despite criticism of the accounting profession, the profession continues, by federal
design, to play a prominent role in the public securities system. See supra notes 5-8 and
accompanying text.
125 Arthur Young, 465 U.S. at 820.
126 Id.
127 See infra notes 140-56 and accompanying text.
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1. The Supreme Court's Reasons for Finding No
Fundamental Unfairness
a. Access to Tax Accrual Workpapers by Others. The Supreme
Court justified its finding that no fundamental unfairness results
from IRS access to tax accrual workpapers by noting that other par-
ties may obtain these same workpapers in nontax settings. 128 The
Court observed that the SEC or private litigants may obtain tax ac-
crual workpapers in securities litigation and concluded that if pri-
vate litigants may obtain workpapers when no public interest is
implicated, "no sound reason exists for conferring lesser authority
upon the IRS" when the public interest in effective revenue collec-
tion is present.1 29
The Court's comparative analysis of IRS and private litigant ac-
cess to tax accrual workpapers appears to follow a "lesser presumes
the greater" reasoning, stating that because the less important ac-
cess by private litigants is allowed, the more important access by the
IRS should be allowed. The Court correctly identified revenue col-
lection as a significant public interest. Revenue collection, however,
is only one of several public interests implicated by a decision to
grant or deny a privilege for tax accrual workpapers. For example, a
grant of privilege for tax accrual workpapers would protect the pub-
lic securities system,' 3 0 preserve the self-assessed federal taxing
structure,13 1 and avoid increased tax litigation by corporate
taxpayers.132
A balancing of the competing interests is more appropriate
than the Court's reasoning because a balancing test permits the
decisionmaker to identify and consider all the competing interests
of society before determining whether to grant or deny a privi-
lege.' 33 The Supreme Court's "lesser presumes the greater" rea-
soning fails to account for all valid public interests. As this Note will
128 Arthur Young, 465 U.S. at 820.
129 Id.
130 See supra notes 101-12 and accompanying text. But see supra note 113. If the
Supreme Court's conclusion that the audit process is self-verifying is correct and no
harm will result to the audit process because of IRS access to tax accrual workpapers, the
public policy factor of protection of the public securities system becomes neutral in de-
termining whether to accord a privilege for tax accrual workpapers.
131 See infra notes 140-56 and accompanying text.
132 See infra notes 157-62 and accompanying text.
133 See J. WIGMORE, supra note 54, § 5285, at 527 (recognition of privilege contin-
gent on conclusion that injury caused to confidential relationship by denial of privilege
outweighs benefits derived by denial of privilege). See also Note, A Balancing Approach to
the Discoverability of Accountant's Tax Liability Worhpapers Under Section 7602 of the Internal
Revenue Code, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 185 (1982) (use of balancing approach in determining
whether IRS should be able to access tax accrual workpapers). But see Nath, supra note
36, at 1590 n.1 18 (balancing test tends to prolong litigation because experts have to
form opinion on general issue and specific case).
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show, a proper balancing of all competing public interests indicates
that some form of privilege should be accorded to an independent
auditor's tax accrual workpapers.
b. IRS Self-Restraint. The Supreme Court noted that IRS self-
restraint in requesting tax accrual workpapers is an alternative to a
formal judicial or statutory privilege. The IRS presently has institu-
tional guidelines providing that IRS agents should request an in-
dependent auditor's tax accrual workpapers only in "unusual
circumstances."' 34 The Internal Revenue Manual defines "unusual
circumstances" as those situations where an agent believes a tax
item to be material and the agent cannot obtain sufficient informa-
tion regarding that item from the taxpayer's records or the in-
dependent auditor's nontax audit workpapers. 135 The Manual also
provides that an agent must seek prior approval of a summons for
tax accrual workpapers from the Chief of the Examinations Division
of the IRS.136
The IRS "unusual circumstances" guidelines for requesting tax
accrual workpapers are a reasonable administrative response to the
controversy surrounding these workpapers. The guidelines, how-
ever, are not an adequate alternative to a formal privilege. First, the
guidelines are not legally enforceable against the IRS. Courts con-
sistently refuse to hold the IRS bound by its announced policies,
reasoning that IRS policies are administrative in nature and do not
create any taxpayer rights.1 37 Furthermore, IRS adherence to the
guidelines is questionable. The IRS reaffirmed its intent to follow
the "unusual circumstances" guidelines eight days after the
Supreme Court announced its decision in Arthur Young, 138 but a
study conducted in 1984 showed a significant increase in IRS re-
quests for tax accrual workpapers.1 39 Although this study is only
134 1 INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL-AUDIT (CCH) § 4024.4, at 7019-3 (May 14, 1981).
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 See, e.g., United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 751-55 (1978) (IRS failure to
follow its internal guidelines does not invalidate agency action per se); United States v.
Price Waterhouse & Co., 515 F. Supp. 996, 999 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (failure to follow inter-
nal guidelines does not preclude IRS action); see also Garbis & Rubin, supra note 34, at
345 ("[Elven in a case in which the particular summons may be issued contrary to the
stated policy [of the IRS,] ... the documents will be subject to production.") (footnote
omitted).
138 Internal Revenue News Release 84-85, STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 54,994
(Mar. 28, 1984).
139 Schnee & Taylor, supra note 29, at 117. The 1984 study showed "a 28% increase
[during the past three-year period] over the [previous] three-year period for the [eight
largest accounting firms] and an 81% increase for the [remaining accounting firms sur-
veyed]." Id. The two three-year time periods compared approximate roughly the time
periods immediately prior and subsequent to the issuance of the "unusual circum-
stances" guidelines in 1981. Id. But see Buchholz & Moraglio, supra note 103, at 92-93
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one attempt to assess the trend of IRS requests for tax accrual
workpapers, it does suggest that reliance on IRS self-restraint as a
substitute for an auditor privilege may be illusory.
2. Fundamental Unfairness and Its Effect on the Self-Assessed
Federal Taxing Structure
Since its inception, the federal taxing system has relied upon
the related concepts of voluntary compliance and self-assessment of
tax liability. Taxpayers determine the amount of tax owed and file
their tax returns. 140 Voluntary compliance and self-assessment per-
mit the federal government to place the responsibilities of assessing,
reporting, and paying federal income taxes on taxpayers, thus
avoiding the cost of having government agents determine the tax
liability for every individual, corporation, trust, and estate in the
United States.' 4 1
Although taxpayers have a legal duty to self-assess taxes and
voluntarily comply with the tax laws, they have no legal duty to pay
the government more money than the law requires. 142 Accordingly,
taxpayers reasonably seek to reduce their tax liabilities to the legal
minimum. Furthermore, taxpayers expect to be treated in a fair
manner when they have reasonable tax disputes with the IRS.143 A
taxpayer faces a significant disadvantage when the IRS is equipped
with workpapers pinpointing "gray areas" in a tax return and expos-
ing the taxpayer's negotiating and litigating positions on such
items. 44 Instead of both the taxpayer and the IRS relying on their
own research, experience, and ingenuity when resolving a reason-
able tax dispute, the IRS has the benefit of most, if not all, of the
(IRS appears to be following its guidelines regarding requests for tax accrual
workpapers).
140 See generally J. SCHNEPPER, INSIDE IRS 61-85 (1978) (discussion of history of fed-
eral income tax in United States).
141 For the year ended September 30, 1980, the IRS examined only 2.02% of all tax
returns filed. 1980 COMM'R INT. REV. ANN. REP., Table 8, at 66 [hereinafter cited as
1980 ANN. REP.]. If the IRS had to determine and assess taxes for 100% of the popula-
tion, IRS costs would increase substantially.
142 In 1947, Judge Learned Hand remarked: "[T]here is nothing sinister in so ar-
ranging one's affairs as to keep taxes as low as possible. . . for nobody owes any public
duty to pay more than the law demands: taxes are enforced exactions, not voluntary
contributions. To demand more in the name of morals is mere cant." Commissioner v.
Newman, 159 F.2d 848, 850-51 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand, J., dissenting). Cf. Address by
Roscoe L. Egger, Jr., Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Mar. 1983), reprinted in A RE-
PORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION ON TAXATION-INVITATIONAL CONFER-
ENCE ON INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE 13 (1983) [hereinafter cited as ABA CONFERENCE ON
INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE] (adversarial relationship between taxpayers and government
is at times proper to maintain balanced tax system).
143 See Buchholz & Moraglio, supra note 103, at 93 (best policy for resolving reason-
able tax disputes between taxpayers and IRS is respect and fairness by both sides).
144 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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taxpayer's work through access to tax accrual workpapers. This im-
balance of information is "fundamentally and inherently unfair"1 45
given the traditionally accepted formulation of taxes as "enforced
exactions, not voluntary contributions." 146
Erosion of taxpayer confidence in the fairness of the federal tax-
ing system may jeopardize federal revenue collections. To function
properly, the self-assessed taxing system requires that the IRS main-
tain public confidence in the fairness of federal taxing.147 Former
Commissioner of Internal Revenue Mortimer Caplin noted that
"the Service must treat taxpayers in a fair, evenhanded manner, and
demonstrate to the public that it is doing so."' 148 Mr. Caplin con-
cluded that the IRS should rethink its position on access to tax ac-
crual workpapers to remove the possibility that the public and tax
practitioners may perceive IRS access to workpapers as an unfair
government advantage.1 49 Other commentators have echoed this
concern about the potential threat to the self-assessed taxing struc-
ture, noting the "Orwellian specter" of the IRS, a governmental
agency, "intruding into the thought processes" of taxpayers and
their advisers. 150
An impaired self-assessment system creates the risk of losing
federal tax revenues because of taxpayer noncompliance with the
tax laws.' 5 ' This risk could carry a high price in lost revenues given
145 Brief Amicus Curiae of The Committee on Corporate Law Departments of the As-
sociation of the Bar of the City of New York at 4, Arthur Young, 465 U.S 805 (1984). See
also Note, supra note 133, at 207 (IRS access to tax accrual workpapers is unfair because
it effectively requires the taxpayer to "prepare the IRS's case").
146 Commissioner v. Newman, 159 F.2d 848, 851 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand, J.,
dissenting).
147 See U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, TREASURY REPORT ON TAx SIMPLIFICATION AND RE-
FORM 9 (Nov. 1984) ("Taxpayer morale ultimately depends. . . on the belief that taxes
are fair. If the basis for this belief comes under suspicion, voluntary compliance with the
tax laws is jeopardized."). See also Caplin, supra note 34, at 82-83 (public confidence in
fairness of taxing system is vital to present taxing structure); Buchholz & Moraglio, supra
note 103, at 93 (self-assessed taxing structure depends on taxpayer honesty which is
fostered by fairness and respect for taxpayers).
148 Caplin, supra note 34, at 82.
149 Id. at 82-83. Cf. Witte & Woodbury, What We Know About The Factors Affecting
Compliance With The Tax Laws, in ABA CONFERENCE ON INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE, supra
note 142, at 139 ("studies indicate that [tax] compliance is higher among those who
believe . . . that the laws are administered equitably").
150 Buchholz & Moraglio, supra note 103, at 93. See also Note, supra note 133, at 207
(IRS access to tax accrual workpapers threatens self-assessed taxing system because of
inherent unfairness of such access).
151 See Jackson, Stemming Income Tax Evasion-The Hole in the Dike is Wfidening, J. AcCT.,
Jan. 1985, at 76, 76-77 (discussing magnitude of federal revenue loss from overall non-
compliance within current taxing system; citing IRS study for estimate that government
did not collect $95.2 billion in 1981 because of problems in current taxing system). See
also Henry, Noncompliance with U.S. Tax Law--Evidence on Income Tax Compliance, in ABA
CONFERENCE ON INCOME TAx COMPLIANCE, supra note 142, at 15-111 (survey and analysis
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the potential widespread effect of IRS access to tax accrual
workpapers on business taxpayers. In 1980, the IRS received
2,061,672 corporate tax returns.15 2 All of these corporations are
either actual or potential audit clients because of their frequent
need for an audit to obtain credit.1 53 Similarly, many unincorpo-
rated businesses are also either actual or potential audit clients be-
cause often they too must submit to an audit to acquire needed
capital.154 Moreover, in a recent study of taxpayer noncompliance
with the tax laws, the IRS attributed approximately thirty-three per-
cent of the total $95.2 billion in uncollected taxes in 1981 ($32 bil-
lion) to corporate and noncorporate businesses.1 55 If IRS access to
tax accrual workpapers spurs a widespread loss of public confidence
in the fairness of federal taxing, the overall tax compliance rate, cur-
rently estimated at about eighty-five percent, 5 6 may drop even fur-
ther. The potential loss of tax revenue resulting from increased
noncompliance with the tax laws may diminish or outweigh any gain
the IRS may derive from the use of tax accrual workpapers in indi-
vidual cases.
D. Increased Tax Litigation
The potential for increased tax litigation, a policy factor not ad-
dressed by the Supreme Court in Arthur Young, also should be con-
sidered in determining whether to accord a privilege to tax accrual
workpapers. Allowing the IRS access to tax accrual workpapers may
lead to an increase in tax litigation by corporate taxpayers.
As indicated previously, the self-assessed federal income tax
system requires taxpayers or their advisers to determine what the
tax law prescribes regarding tax treatment of various financial trans-
of various studies regarding taxpayer noncompliance leads to rough consensus that tax-
payers did not report $100 billion of taxable income in 1976).
Of course, the IRS could increase its enforcement efforts to counter a drop in vol-
untary compliance by taxpayers. Such increased efforts, however, would be costly, con-
sidering that in the year ended September 30, 1980, for example, the IRS audited less
than 7% of all corporate tax returns and only approximately 2% of all individual tax
returns filed. 1980 ANN. REP., supra note 141, Table 8, at 66-67.
152 See 1980 ANN. REP., supra note 141, Table 7, at 64.
153 Statistics are not maintained on the total number of companies audited each year
by independent auditors. At a minimum, however, the 10,717 companies currently re-
quired to file audited financial statements with the SEC will be affected by Arthur loung.
Telephone interview with Joseph Meiburger, Staff of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (Feb. 11, 1985) (citing SEC, DIRECTORY OF COMPANIES REQUIRED TO FILE AN-
NUAL REPORTS WITH THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Introduction) (July
1984)).
154 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
155 See Jackson, supra note 151, at 78 (derived from breakdown of IRS estimate of
lost income tax revenue in 1981).
156 Id. at 77.
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actions. As all taxpayers can attest, the Code is complex. 57 This
complexity arises, in part, because the Code employs a generalized
approach and contains provisions intended to apply to millions of
taxpayers. 158 Given that the Code is not always clear, reasonable
people, in good faith, may differ as to the tax treatment of a particu-
lar financial item or transaction. 159 These differences between the
IRS and taxpayers are frequently settled through negotiation. For
example, in the year ended September 30, 1980, the IRS and tax-
payers settled 41,963 or approximately 84% of the 49,971 federal
tax cases closed.' 6 0 The Second Circuit noted in Arthur Young that
the IRS-taxpayer negotiation and settlement process "strike[s] an
appropriate balance between collecting revenue and conserving ju-
dicial resources."''
IRS access to an independent auditor's tax accrual workpapers
may encourage taxpayers to by-pass the negotiating process because
of the IRS's superior bargaining position. With access to tax accrual
workpapers, the IRS knows exactly where a corporate taxpayer ex-
pects or hopes to compromise on an asserted tax deficiency. The
IRS may use this information as a starting point in negotiations,
thus attempting to force a compromise at a higher amount of tax
than would have been attempted without such information. 62 As a
result, corporate taxpayers may become more litigious in reasonable
157 SeeJ. SCHNEPPER, supra note 140, at 13-15 (tax code is complex for all persons
who deal with it, evidenced by "average 75 percent error rate on tax returns filed by paid
preparers" in nationwide sample audits by IRS).
158 For the year ended September 30, 1980, the IRS received and processed a total
of 96,409,932 tax returns, consisting of 90,727,115 individual tax returns, 2,061,672
corporate tax returns, 1,820,708 fiduciary (trust and estate) tax returns, and 1,800,437
other types of tax returns. 1980 ANN. REP., supra note 141, Table 8, at 66-67.
159 Arthur Young, 677 F.2d at 220. See also M. SALTZMAN, supra note 105, 9.01-.11, at
9-1 to 9-59 (detailed discussion of appeals process for tax disputes with IRS); M. GARBIS
& S. STRuNTz, TAX PROCEDURE AND TAx FRAUD 25-30 (1982) (ethics of tax practice re-
quire that tax preparer have only "reasonable support" for client's position for items in
tax return) (excerpting Corneel, Ethics Guidelines for Tax Practice, 28 TAx L. REv. 1
(1972)).
160 1980 ANN. REP., supra note 141, Tables 15-16, at 74. In the year ended Septem-
ber 30, 1980, the IRS Examinations Division examined 2,179,297 tax returns. Of this
total, the IRS settled 1,997,302 or 90% by agreement with the taxpayer, taxpayer pay-
ment, or taxpayer default. Id. Table 12, at 72.
This high rate of settlement of tax disputes by the IRS and taxpayers has been a
consistent feature of the federal taxing structure. See, e.g., E. GRISWOLD & M. GRAETZ,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 1063-65 (1976) (in 10 year period 1963-1973, IRS and tax-
payers settled 97% of all tax disputes; in 1973, IRS and taxpayers settled 54,351 cases
while federal judiciary decided 1,738 tax cases) (citing 1973 COMM'R INT. REV. ANN.
REP.).
161 Arthur Young, 677 F.2d at 220.
162 See generally C. KARRASS, THE NEGOTIATING GAME 61 (1970) ("The more a negoti-
ator knows about an opponent's objectives and bargaining position the stronger he is.");
H. COHEN, YOU CAN NEGOTIATE ANYTHING 101-13 (1980) (information is power; know-
ing wants, limits, and priorities of other side provides decisive advantage).
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tax disputes because the increased cost of compromise may out-
weigh the cost of litigating, and possibly winning, such tax disputes.
IRS access to tax accrual workpapers may result in increased
revenue collection and improved IRS efficiency by facilitating quick
identification of "gray areas" and relevant facts surrounding tax dis-
putes. If corporate taxpayers become more litigious in tax disputes,
however, the positive benefits may be outweighed or reduced by the
increased cost of litigating a greater number of tax cases. Conse-
quently, although the United States treasury may benefit from IRS
access to tax accrual workpapers, the magnitude of the benefit, if
any, is subject to question because of possible increased govern-
ment litigation costs.
In sum, some type of privilege protection should be accorded
to tax accrual workpapers because the public policy benefits of
granting a privilege outweigh the costs of denying the IRS access to
the workpapers. Because the Supreme Court has ruled against such
a privilege, only the legislature can take corrective action. The
Supreme Court itself stated inArthur Young that "[tihis kind of policy
choice is best left to the Legislative Branch."' 63 Congress should
respond to this challenge and provide protection for tax accrual
workpapers.
V
AUDITOR PRIVILEGE LEGISLATION
Once Congress accepts the need for an auditor privilege, it
must determine the appropriate scope of the privilege. The starting
point for determining the scope of a privilege is the guideline that a
privilege should be no greater or less than that which is necessary
and warranted by policy interests. 164 Three principal questions
arise in applying this guideline to an auditor privilege: what is to be
163 Arthur Young, 465 U.S. at 821.
164 SeeJ. WIGMORE, supra note 54, § 2285, at 527 (One of four conditions precedent
to recognition of privilege is that "[tihe injury that would incur to the [confidential] rela-
tion by the disclosure of the communication must be greater than the benefit thereby gained
[by disclosure of the communication].") (emphasis in original; footnote omitted).
The common law recognized the need to balance the public interests implicated
when determining the scope of a privilege, as evidenced by the limitations placed on the
traditional privileges for attorney-client and husband-wife confidential communications.
For example, the attorney-client privilege does not extend to communications before or
after the professional relationship, id. § 2304, at 586, communications not relevant to
legal advice, id. § 2310, at 598-99, or generally to acts or facts not subject to express
communications, id. § 2306, at 590-91. Exceptions to the husband-wife privilege in-
clude cases involving certain injuries inflicted by one spouse on the other spouse, a
wife's correspondence with her husband in cases of criminal conversation, criminal ac-
tions for family desertion, and civil suits for nonsupport. Id. § 2338, at 665-66.
1986]
722 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:694
protected, who is to be protected, and when such protection should
be extended.
The first question refers to what specific documents the privi-
lege should cover. Most privilege advocates agree that only an in-
dependent auditor's tax accrual workpapers deserve protection.' 65
Expanding the privilege to include an auditor's other documenta-
tion is unnecessary because disclosure of other documentation to
the IRS does not expose sensitive tax information, the impetus un-
derlying creation of the privilege. Furthermore, the Powell standard
of relevancy, which limits the IRS summons power to include only
relevant documents, will continue to provide adequate protection
for an auditor's other documents. 66
The second question concerns whether the privilege should ap-
ply only to audits of publicly held companies or to audits of privately
held companies as well. In Arthur Young, the Second Circuit directed
its "work product privilege" to audits of publicly held companies,
focusing on the need to protect the public securities markets.' 67
Under this approach, protection of tax accrual workpapers of pri-
vate companies would be unnecessary because these companies may
not access the public capital markets.
Although private companies do not participate in the public se-
curities system, these companies do affect the public because they
obtain credit and capital from private lenders and investors. 168
These lenders and investors often require an audit of a private com-
pany by an independent auditor before lending or investing finan-
165 See, e.g., Caplin, supra note 37, at 199 (distinction between tax accrual workpapers
and corporate records). See also Note, An Appraisal of Arthur Young: A Valuable Privilege
for Accountants, 48 ALB. L. REv. 109, 145 (1983).
166 See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
167 See supra notes 69-78 and accompanying text. The Second Circuit did not ad-
dress whether a privilege should protect tax accrual workpapers in an audit of a private
company because Amerada Hess was a publicly held corporation. Given the circuit
court's focus on protecting the public securities system, a factor not present in private
company audits, protection of tax accrual workpapers in private company audits would
require the court to adopt a more expansive view of the purpose underlying a privilege
for tax accrual workpapers than it expressed in Arthur Young.
168 Private lending institutions lend depositors' funds to businesses and other loan
applicants. If those loans become uncollectible, depositors may not suffer directly be-
cause of federal insurance, but others are deprived of funds which could have been em-
ployed productively. Further, the public may invest or lend financial resources directly
to private companies. If these investments or loans fail, not only do those members of
the public suffer, but, again, others are deprived of resources which could have been
employed productively. See A. ARENS & J. LOEBBECKE, supra note 9, at 1 ("Unreliable
information can cause inefficient use of resources to the detriment of society and to the
decision makers themselves."). But see Note, supra note 165, at 141-42 (less need for
privilege for small business corporations because lenders and investors are "more
closely associated" with such entities).
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cial resources. 169 Absent a privilege for tax accrual workpapers in
private company audits, users of private company financial state-
ments may suffer the same harm as investors in the public securities
markets. IRS access to tax accrual workpapers in private company
audits may inhibit managers in their communications with in-
dependent auditors. In short, IRS access to tax accrual workpapers
in either public or private company audits threatens the audit pro-
cess and increases the risk that materially misstated financial state-
ments reach investors. 170
Moreover, the other policy reasons underlying recognition of a
privilege (preventing an appearance of impaired auditor indepen-
dence, avoiding increased tax litigation, and protecting the self-as-
sessed federal taxing structure) apply equally to public and private
company audits. The factors that give rise to these public policy
concerns are present in both types of audits. For example, IRS ac-
cess to tax accrual workpapers in an audit of either a public or pri-
vate company may affect the credibility of audit findings because the
public may perceive the auditor as an adversary of the company
rather than as a disinterested professional. The possibilities of in-
creased tax litigation and damage to the self-assessed federal taxing
structure also apply to private companies, perhaps with even greater
emphasis than public companies, given the large number of private
companies.17' Because audits of public and private companies im-
plicate the same policy concerns, a legislatively created privilege
should include private company audits as well as audits of public
companies. 172
The third question, concerning when the privilege should be
169 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
170 See Stanger, Auditors' Tax Accrual Work Papers-A New Work Product Privilege, 5
CORP. L. REV. 374, 377-78 (1982) ("[T]he [privilege] rationale can be extended to the
auditor's attest function ... for the protection of lenders who also rely on financial
statements of the [private] borrower in making their lending decisions.").
A private company may engage an accountant to perform a "review" or "compila-
tion" of financial statements as a substitute for an audit conducted in accordance with
GAAS. "Reviews" and "compilations" are special accounting services, costing less than
an audit, that provide less assurance that the financial statements are presented fairly in
accordance with GAAP. See 1 PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, supra note 10, at AR §§ 100-
9300. This Note does not address whether privilege protection should entend to any tax
accrual workpapers prepared by an accountant in connection with these special services.
171 See supra notes 151-62 and accompanying text.
172 Coverage of both public and private companies is consistent with a recent legis-
lative bill, H.R. 5431, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984), introduced in the House of Repre-
sentatives. Representative Ron Paul introduced H.R. 5431 on April 11, 1984, proposing
to amend § 7602 by adding the following new subsection:
(d) CERTAIN TAX WORKPAPERS OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS MAY NOT BE
SUMMONED, ETC. - Nothing in this title shall be construed to authorize-
(1) a summons to be issued under this title for the production of
workpapers prepared by an independent auditor with respect to the ade-
1986] 723
CORNELL LA4 W REVIEW
extended, addresses whether the IRS should be barred from acces-
sing tax accrual workpapers in all circumstances, and, if not, under
what circumstances IRS access should be permitted. A flat ban on
IRS access would provide an easy standard for courts and the great-
est protection of workpapers, but it also would preclude IRS access
when extenuating circumstances make such access necessary. For
example, where a natural or man-made disaster destroys corporate
records, IRS access to tax accrual workpapers should be allowed be-
cause the workpapers will constitute the only source of information
regarding the tax return.173 Similarly, where the IRS shows a prima
facie case of tax fraud, tax accrual workpapers may be a necessary
source of information. Fraud requires proof of fraudulent intent,
and corporate documents may not contain enough information to
prove that intent.1 74
A legislative presumption of no IRS access to tax accrual
workpapers, rebuttable by the IRS upon a showing of "true hard-
ship and need," would accommodate both the general need for pro-
tection of tax accrual workpapers and instances of specific need by
the IRS to gain access to the workpapers.175 A presumption of no
IRS access would protect tax accrual workpapers by shifting the bur-
den of proof to the IRS to show "true hardship and need." The
privilege legislation may include as illustrations of "true hardship
and need" the instances of corporate records destruction and prima
facie cases of tax fraud. The legislation, however, should not con-
tain a narrow definition of "true hardship and need" nor an exclu-
sive listing of what circumstances will satisfy this standard. A
narrow definition or listing would preclude the possibility of recog-
nizing other instances of legitimate IRS need for tax accrual
workpapers. Flexibility is desirable because it will allow courts to
quacy and reasonableness of a taxpayer's reserve for contingent tax liabil-
ities, or
(2) the taking of testimony with respect to such workpapers.
H.R. 5431, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
H.R. 5431 was referred to the House Committee on Ways and Means, but the Com-
mittee did not undertake any action regarding the bill. Not enacted as law at the time of
adjournment of the 98th Congress, H.R. 5431 is no longer a viable bill. Furthermore,
because Rep. Paul was not reelected to the House in 1984, the prospects for reintroduc-
tion of H.R. 5431 or introduction of other similar legislation regarding tax accrual
workpapers are questionable.
173 See Caplin, supra note 37, at 199.
174 The Second Circuit recognized an exception to its auditor privilege for cases
involving taxpayer fraud. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
175 The Second Circuit also endorsed limiting the privilege for tax accrual
workpapers by allowing IRS access where the IRS meets a threshold of need. See Arthur
Young, 677 F.2d at 221 ("sufficient showing of need" by IRS for access to tax accrual
workpapers). See also Note, IRS Access to Tax Accrual Workpapers: Legal Considerations and
Policy Concerns, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 468, 488 (1982) (endorsement of "sufficient show-
ing of need" as threshold for IRS access to tax accrual workpapers).
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mold the privilege to reflect basic changes in public needs and ac-
commodate new circumstances in relations among corporate tax-
payers, independent auditors, and the IRS.176
CONCLUSION
United States v. Arthur Young & Co. ended the judicial controversy
over whether the IRS may obtain an independent auditor's tax ac-
crual workpapers under section 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code.
The Supreme Court refused to establish an auditor privilege, grant-
ing the IRS unlimited access to the workpapers. Congress should
respond to the Arthur Young decision and create a statutory privilege
for tax accrual workpapers because public policy reasons support
such a privilege.
The grant of a privilege for tax accrual workpapers will protect
investors and creditors from materially misstated financial state-
ments, maintain the appearance of auditor independence, preserve
the self-assessed federal taxing structure, and avoid increased cor-
porate tax litigation. These benefits outweigh any increase in reve-
nue collection or improvement of IRS efficiency that denial of a
privilege may provide.
A legislatively created privilege for an independent auditor's
tax accrual workpapers should cover workpapers prepared in an au-
dit of either a public or private company. Both types of audits impli-
cate the policy concerns that require the creation of a privilege. The
legislative protection should encompass a presumption of no IRS
access to tax accrual workpapers, rebuttable by the IRS upon a
showing of "true hardship and need." A rebuttable presumption
satisfies the general need for tax accrual workpaper protection, but
still provides courts with the flexibility to modify the privilege as
public needs change regarding these seemingly uninteresting yet
highly explosive workpapers.
Scot L. Kline
176 Cf In re LTV Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595, 621 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (changing societal
relationships require periodic review of need for and extent of attorney-client privilege).
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